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NOTRE DAME LAWYER

BOOK REVIEWS
JUBILEE LAW LECTuREs: 1889-1939. By Roscoe Pound and others. The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 1939.

These eight lectures were arranged by the School of Law of the Catholic
University of America "as a contribution to the celebration of the Golden Jubilee Year" of that university, as Dean Robert J. White tells us in the preface.
The first series comprises four lectures by Roscoe Pound on the general subject,
"The Church in Legal History." They are rich in legal lore and juristic erudition
-as all readers of the scholarly papers of the former Harvard dean would be
prepared to expect. Here we encounter, not only Bartolus, Ulpian, Gratian, Isidore, Gregory, Bracton, Justinian, Coke and Blackstone-to say notohing of
Pollock, Maitland, Story, Savigny, Holmes. and other recent Bartolists and
worthies of bench and bar, of tribunal and wool-sack - but also Aristotle and
Aquinas.
In these days when the layman all too frequently, and most of the time
-unjustly, refers to lawyers, attorneys, counsels, barristers and advocates as shysters, ambulance chasers and "mouthpieces," it is meet and just as well as wholesome to renew acquaintance with the noble historical background of a profession
which had its glories and played a pivotal part in the course of civilization.
For the man of law in the past was never a mere "business adviser" although
our businessman's civilization has done much to reduce -him to that condition.
Moreover, in these same days, when nominalism, behaviorism and pragmatism
have been transferred from the field of pure or speculative philosophy to the
more practical domain of law and jurisprudence by such legal thinkers as Thurman Arnold and Jerome Frank, it is highly desirable that there be a return to
those philosophical principles which historically supplied so many data and
premises (sometimes, but not always, as unconscious presuppositions) for the
structure of legal doctrine. The ideas of these modem skeptics are not entirely
new, of course. In 1345, Judge Hilary said, "the law is the will of the judges,"
while Chief Justice Stonore replied, "No, law is that which is right." Today,
the self-styled "realists" insist that law is the totality of official behavior instead
of a collection of abstract rules and that "what the judge and jury do" is more
importait than what the judge says. But besides confusing morals (mores, folkways, customs, conventions, etc.) with ethics, or, in other words, "ought" with
"is", they forget the solution of the moderate realism of Aristotle and Aquinas
for whom the abstract universals exist, ut sic, in the mind but have an objective counterpart or a basis in reality. Thus, to a Thomist, it is not difficult to
reconcile the statement in the First Institute of Sir Edward Coke (1628) to the
effect that "reason is the life of the law" with the assertion of" 0. W. Holmes
that "the life of the law has not been logic but experience." One may also
allow for the human equation and agree with Lord Halsbury that "the law is
not always logical" or with J. Bailhache when he avers that "our law is not a
science," even if this last declaration requires some qualification. The law may
be an experiment and a weapon or means but it is also something more, something deeper. Even Holmes' who was impatient of axioms and dogmas and
who seemed to favor the definition of law as "what is decided by the courts,"
denied that he was a cynic and wrote: "The law is the witness and external
deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history of the moral development
of the race."
In the present work, the four lectures by Roscoe Pound deal with four ideas,
viz., universality, authority, good faith and law, which were contributed to the
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law by the Church. In the first lecture (which might be read along with the
Harvard Tercentary address by Etienne Gilson on "Medieval Universalism"), he
enumerates three phases of the universal idea in its relation to law, namely, the
conceptions of a universal church, of a universal empire, and of law as an ex2
pression of justice and truth and the eternal reason of the Creator. He illustrates his thesis with examples from the church-state controversy, the laws of
marriage and the "great subject of Conflict of Laws". He then shows how
nationalist theories of law and the 19th century analytical school rejected this
universalism which, however, is enjoying a revival of late. This resuscitation is
in large part due to the increasing interest in comparative lav.s
The second lecture treats of the idea of authority and the author, after contrasting medieval with modern values, points out that "the lawyers learned
from the church and have since assumed, that what lay behind law in all of its
senses was authority." 4 Then after discussing different kinds of control, the
need of both stability and change, and the psychologic and economic bases of
the quest for authority, he declares that the- "unchallengeable bases universally
recognized" in the Middle Ages were the Bible, the Patristic writings, the logical
method of Aristotle and the legislation of Justinian.5 Then follows an account
of the technique of the glossators and,-later, the commentators. Here one might
object 0 to the statements regarding: "Scholastic philosophy, with its reliance
upon dialectical development of authoritatively given premises" and "Reason was
appealed to, to sustain authority. But the reason appealed to was a reason
itself resting on authority." This is true, and rightly so, in theology but not in
philosophy and the distinction is made by St. Thomas Aquinas in a classic text,
Summa Theologia, P. 1, q. 1, a. 8.
Pound's third lecture shows how the idea of good faith was absent from the
ancient codes and that "the performance of promises" as a legal conception was
furnished by the Church. We cannot enter here into his account of contracts
in the Roman law and at Common law but he shows that the Romans turned
7
duty which was originally a moral idea into a legal conception, but the Roman
law did not grow and the Roman law of contracts did not "shake off the ideas
of the strict law." Showing the importance of nuda pacta, of promises which
are not bargains, ii the economic order, in international relations and, generally,
in any developed social order where uniformity, reliability and predictability in
human conduct 'are indispensable and that by secular means alone the idea of
good faith has little support. With reference to the doctrine of consideration
and the idea of specific performance he blames the attitude and tradition of
"strict law" for the."feeling amounting to a conviction that promises simply as
such ought not to be enforced." The church was the force behind this fundamental ethical and legal conception of good faith which belongs in the field
where the moral and the legal orders overlap. Modern extreme secularization
has transferred to the law and to public education what the home and the
Church formerly performed as tasks of social control 8 and Pound is pessimistic
about their prospects as substitutes for the latter. He is not wrong.
The fourth and final lecture deals with the idea of law by which the author
means not laws or special rules or detailed provisions or an aggregate of these
but rather general ideas, rules, principles and received ideals. He shows that
2
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Greek philosophers and Roman jurists sought something behind special rules and
particular laws of the primitive legal order. He tells us that "the lawyers of
the church and the theologian philosophers of the church took over from Roman
law the idea of natural law and made of it the chief instrument of creative lawmaking and the great liberalizing agency in law for the modern world." 9
Gratian expounded' "the ideal foundation on which all laws were to rest." St.
Thomas's account of the natural law with the eternal law behind it, is assigned
major credit for the fact that "laws were made subordinate to law" and that
"the law of nature prevailed over custom and over the ordinances of princes.
Suarez, Ockham and John of Salisbury are also quoted.
By implication, I believe one may fairly say that Roscoe Pound has little
regard for such modern theories of law as skeptical realism, psychological realism,
phenomenalism, Marxism, psycho-analysis, positivism.' 0 His conclusion, after
many tributes, is: "I do not say, as some are doing, back to Aristotle and St.
Thomas Aquinas. But I do say we need philosophers of their organizing genius
to make what has come after them fruitful for mankind."
The second half of this little volume consists of a series of four lectures on
"the Function of Law in Society Today." Contributors to this part two are
Daniel J. Lyne of the Boston Bar, Grenville Clark of the New York Bar, Hector
David Castro of El Salvador and John J. Burns of Boston. The first of these
lecturers spoke of "The Future of the Common Law." He showed how "the two
important characteristics of the Common Law of yesterday" were "its devotion
to liberty and its protection of individual rights." 11 He then traces the changes
in the direction of increasing social emphasis and attention to the common good.
Among his illustrations special attention is given to the growth of administrative
boards and to "the extension of the power of the Federal Government" because
"only a power that is national can serve the interests of all." He urges the
need of vigilance lest organized minorities impose their ideologies upon our
democracy. His conclusion sounds somewhat like Republican propaganda in behalf of business.
The second lecture in this second series is by Grenville Clark on the subject
of "Law and Civil Liberty." This consists of a courageous plea for "safeguarding
freedom of expression." The lecturer is a bold champion of tolerance and goes
rather far in his opposition to censorship in any form. He bases his thesis upon
the proposition that "our institutions rest upon the conception of a government
based on the consent of the people-a consent that can only be real if neither
coerced nor uninformed." 12 He insists that there be true consent with discussion of implications, not a nominal or supposed consent. He stresses the
prime importance of education and the advantages in a deeper knowledge of
history. The law "must -foster free debate in public matters" if our "basic philosophy is to live and grow."
The third lecture in this second series is by Hector D. Castro and deals with
"Natural Law and Positive Law." He begins by contrastinz the materialistic
and positivistic conception of law and society with the spiritualistic school of
thought. He defends with the latter the notion of natural rights and enumerates
some of these. He rejects the view of nature held by Hobbes as well as the
social contract theory. He attributes to positive law three functions and insists
that it be subject to the natural law and that it recognize and regulate natural
rights. As he develops his thesis, euthanasia, slavery, Communism and the
usurpation by the State of the role of parents in education, etc., are repudiated.
9 Id. at p. 74.
10 Id. at pp. 6; 29; 90-97.
11 Id. at p. 102.
12 Id. at p. 129.
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The final lecture by John J. Burns is entitled "Law and Ethics." It begins
with a resume of the other seven papers and is otherwise somewhat rambling
and diffuse. In rather desultory fashion, the contributions of ethics, philosophy,
virtue and morality to positive law, are illustrated by a variety of instances.
The discrepancy between legal policy and moral obligation, the lag between the
"ought" and the "is" and the difference between Oswald Spengler and Jacques
Maritain, are demonstrated.
Daniel C. O'Grady.18

D THE PROFiss, by Charles Francis Coe; The Harrison Co., Atlanta,
LAw
Georgia. $3.00. pp. 240.

Although the title of this book does prove to be slightly *facetious, the work
itself is delightfully entertaining and amusing for both the professional and nonprofessional person. In addition to its enjoyable attributes, its friendly and informal style, the book affords immeasurable help to the practicing lawyer because
of the interesting presentation of the practical legal problems of the author as
they confronted him together with the intelligent manner in which he solved
them.
The purpose of the book is to examine into the relationship of client and
attorney, jury and attorney, witness and attorney, and judge and attorney.
Technicality is left strictly at home. Form is discarded in favor of chronology
in order to give the desired force and effect to each problem as it actually faced
the author in real life. To effectuate the first named purpose, the author vitalizes
the various states of mind of some of his clients to prove the premise that when
a client has no use for a lawyer, he is a person to be avoided, as one possessing
mysterious ways and magical formulas; but as soon as a client has need for a
lawyer, everything is different. He desires to be friendly with the lawyer and
wants his mysterious ways and magical formulas applied to his particular needs.
In discussing the relationship between jury and attorney, and witness and
attorney, the author makes some suggestions which, if given some degree of
thought, will prove of unending value to the young lawyer. In the case of a
juror, for instance, you should not test for his mere honesty but for particular
knowledge of the juror, his likes and dislikes. The type of case will also determine the type of juror to be selected. The author also points out that if the
art of cross-examination is to be effective, the lawyer must have the ability to
properly appraise the instinctive reactions of witnesses. The law student and
young lawyer will gain a wealth of knowledge on the subjects of cross-examination and examinations of jurors because of the remarkable ability of the author
in those fields.
Some of the subjects which are given particular attention are wills, real
property, the doctrine of stare decisis, the future of administrative law, and the
activity of judges. The great necessity for each person to have a will is pointed
out very strongly, as is the necessity for careful and accurate work on the part
of the lawyer in drafting the will in order to cover all possibilities and avoid
all d'sputes. Legl l'anvua-e must never lend itself tM a varied interpretation.
The law of real property is dismissed with a shower of adjectives denoting the
author's utter contempt for the practice of that branch of the law. His reasoning
seems to be quite logical.
13
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The author's discussion of the doctrine of stare decisis and administrative law
is highly illuminating and provides the reader with a great deal of food for
thought. I am sure that every lawyer is cognizant of the fact that the doctrine
has shackled the progress of the law to a certain degree in order to maintain
and establish precedents. Mr. Coe sets forth what I consider to be a very persuasive criticism of the doctrine in the following words: "But I think it becomes
a false doctrine when it closes its eyes to progress and embitters hope and retards
striving by the fetters of implacable adherence to truths which have been consumed in the march of the centuries; truths which have been unbalanced by
greater truths in other fields." Due to the strict adherence to the doctrine of
stare decisis by the judges, "the administration of Law in our Courts remains
an oxcart while the body of Law itself shifts to the motor-driven vehicle of
Boards and Commissions." How perfectly true that is. The remedy for this
situation lies in the lawyers, says Mr. Coe. They must decide "whether our
people shall trade the sanctuary of the law for the facility of the tribunal."
Having written many books on divers subjects and innumerable articles for
national magazines, Mr. Coe has proved his literary ability, which, coupled with
an extensive knowledge of fundamental legal principles and the practical application of such principks, has given to the legal profession a book containing
a wealth of thought, idea, and suggestive material in the author's own fanciful
style of expression. The book is heartily recommended as providing a delightfully entertaining expose of the practical problems facing every lawyer.
John Wilson.

PRAcrIINGo LAW.

Pp. 567.

By Silvester E. Quindry.1

Washington Law Book Co. 1938.

$3.75.

It is interesting in these days when popular diatribes are published and widely
read to read a book with the refreshing attitude of PRAcTIcrNcG LAW. The author
is obviously a man who has enjoyed a successful life, but above all a happy life
in the practice of his profession. It is a silent indictment of those who would have
us believe that the practice of law is mummery, sham, or worse. Written in the
fashion of a series of personal essays, it admirably portrays through the medium
of narrative and good advice the enthusiasm of the author for his work. Nothing
could be more of an antidote to the work of modern day hyper-intellectuals who
seem to know all about a profession they boast they have never practiced.
Aside from the prophylactic effect of the book, however, it is one containing
a wealth of information about its subject-matter. It should be read by anyone
contemplating the practice of law because it undoubtedly covers the field in a
manner at once interesting and informative. The experiences of a lifetime are
condensed within a few pages. The style is easy and familiar. The information is
practical. The only criticism that could be made of the presentation is that at
times the author's preoccupation with his topic leads him to cram experiences
and facts on his pages, one after another, in a way characteristic more of a reference work than a book to be read as easily as this one is.
Although the material compiled will be of more practical value to the student
contemplating the continuance of his studies in law, or the lawyer just beginning
practice, it will be of more pleasure to the lawyer enjoying a practice all ready,
because it is, to some extent at least, autobiographical of the lawyer, and of all
lawyers.
1
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For the law student, it gives an interesting course in the practical phases of
the profession that most young lawyers learn only through experience, or not at
all. The book treats of preparation for the study of the law, choosing a location, the
office and library, whether to practice alone, with a firm, or a partner, handling
clients, - in brief - it covers the practice of law, its when, where, and how.
FrancisE. Bright.

STUDras IN THE ADEQUACY OF THE CONSTITUTION.

Parker & Baird Company.

1939.

By James Barclay Smith.1

pp. xv, 366.

Professor Smith has published here a series of essays primarily concerned with
the problems of our present industrial order as related to constitutional questions.
In rapid succession he treats the constitutional aspects of such problems as government competition and ownership, child labor, public utility regulation, regulation
of labor and employment relations, price control with special reference to ratemaking, the regulation of commerce in relation to due process, the functions of
non-judicial bodies, and the federalization of law under the full faith and credit
clause. Possible overlapping is explained by the fact that all but one of the
articles, in substance, at least, was previously published in one or another of the
various law reviews.
In the first chapter, the author gives special consideration to the theory of
American government. Historically the approach to this problem is adequate;
but the author should have defined his concepts'a little more carefully. Evidently, his idea of natural law is essentially rationalistic, advancing the theory that
it means that it is right to do what ever we are impelled to do by our natures;
in other words, he rejects or, at least ignores objective standards of natural law.
Thus, he arrives at the conclusion, that natural law leads to anarchy. He seems
to confuse natural law with Rousseauistic naturalism.
In the field of constitutional law, the author is profound and scholarly. His
analysis is searching and accurate. The various problems considered, although
the first chapter dealing with government competition is far below the standard
of the rest of the book, are treated both with an eye to what has been done
and what can and should be done in the logical development of our constitutional law.
The author's style is unusual enough to be note-worthy. In spots, the construction is a little too labored to be entirely lucid or fluent; the vocabulary
used seems a little too Thesaurian to be true. Altogether, the book is penetrating
enough to be of definite value to the student of constitutional law. For a book
on controversial questions, it is logical, analytical and completely sound.
Francis E. Bright.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE END OF ONE HUNDRED FIFTY

YARs. Indiana University Publications, Social Science Series No. 1. 1939.
troduction by Hugh Evander Willis.1 Pp. 72. $.75.
1 Professor of Law, University of Kansas.
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This book is an attempt to set forth very briefly the Constitution of the United
States - both the Constitution as it was written and amended in its first one
hundred fifty years of existence and the Constitution as it exists today by virtue
of the interpretation put on its various clauses by the Supreme Court of the
United States. The book is the practical result of the doctrine that the Constitution
is "what the Supreme Court says it is." The monograph contains a brief introduction tracing the history of the Constitution against the background of the men
who have sat on -that court and have "said what it is." The rest of the pages are
devoted to setting out the Constitution in a novel frame - the frame of its interpretation.
The Constitution is printed in a form emphasizing the "seven great constitutional doctrines" which Professor Willis states to be the foundation of our system,
as well as that part of the work of interpretation which is permanently woven
into our governmental structure. The monograph illustrates the progressive nature
of the original document, pointing out that the Constitution is not a static control. It is rather a constantly changing thing in the hands of the Supreme Court
In the explanatory note to the book, it is stated that the purpose of the
project is to inform the general public of the true nature of the Constitution in
the light of judicial interpretation. This then is the criterion one must use to
evaluate the work of the editors. It is true that the introduction and the form
of the work should impress on the mind of an average layman that the Constitution as ordinarily presented is not complete. However, it is safe to doubt whether
the book will be of great aid in educating the public to a realization and understanding of the whole Constitution. It is to be questioned whether any layman
will understand this version better as a whole than he will the original. The reason
why people are not familiar with the Constitution is that they do not understand what it means. Though parts of the edition here are excellently clarified,
much of it will be as unintelligible as it ever was.
On the other hand, the book is undoubtedly a step in the right direction. The
limitation of space and the limitation produced by the paucity of interpretation
of some clauses are valid excuses for the book's inability to do the whole job.
In any case the product of such an original idea should be of interest to anyone
who is devoting either part of his time or all of it to a study of constitutional law.
FrancisE. Bright.

WOE UNTO You LAwYERs!
Pp. 274. $2.50.

By Fred Rodell.'

Reynal & Hitchcock, 1939.

This is a vicious tirade against a highly respected and indispensable profession; it is a scathing rebuke of the Constitution, the laws under it and the
lawyers who plead it. The author, in his unwarranted attack on the field of
law and its constituents, spares no bitter words of insult in constantly criticizing
this modern group of ."medicine men . . . this pseudo-intellectual autocracy,
guarding the tricks of its trade from the uninitiated, and running, after its own
pattern, the civilization of its day."
The author, incidentally a law professor in one of the country's law schools,
continually pours forth his outlandish and absurd statements, which, if true,
would convince the laymen of this country that there is no real need for lawyers
and courts; that they are merely being "used" by the lawyers and judges for a
1 Professor of Law, Yale University.
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source of income; that such a thing as rule-making is entirely too simple to
call for a judge to apply it, or for a three-year education to learn it. The author
would have us believe that the profession of law, in contrast to other professions,
is merely a sham, being something quite simple and readily comprehensible by
any person with average intelligence, whether he chances to study the intricacies
of the law or not. This simplicity, the author contends, is, of course, camouflaged by complex legal jargon, invented and maintained by the lawyers to "completely baffle and befoozle the ordinary literate man who has no legal training
to serve him as a trot."
The author further bombards the profession with: "The legal trade is nothing
but a high class racket . . . the lawyers are not even aware that they are indulging in a racket. And the general public, scared, befuddled, impressed and
ignorant, they take what is fed them, or rather take what is sold them."
The doctrine of separation of powers is even denied when the author states
that the President or Congress have as much right to decide whether a Statute
violates the Constitution or not as the Supreme Court does.
The writer searched long, but unsuccessfully, in his groping through a mass
of ridiculous analogies, absurd and outlandish statements, and unwarranted, insuiting remarks, to find something to compliment. At the most it is destructive
criticism. This warning, "Woe Unto You Lawyers," will be neither heard nor
heeded-by either layman or lawyer.

John C. O'Connor

